# 2AC

### War Powers - Warming

#### Presidents empirically proven to fail at war planning – hasty decision-making leads to unintended conflicts.

Griffin, ’12 [Stephen M. Griffin is a Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in Constitutional Law at Tulane University Law School, served as a Bigelow Fellow at the University of Chicago and research instructor in law at New York University, received the Sumter Marks Award in recognition of his publications; “The Tragic Pattern of the War Power: Presidential Decisions for War since 1945”; 2012]

This is an essential pillar of the reasoning of enthusiasts of unilateral presidential decisionmaking in foreign affairs. Because of the military legacy of the Cold War, presidents today not only have the ability to make swift decisions, but to actually have them visited rapidly on the enemy. There is also little doubt that Yoo’s somewhat Napoleonic portrayal of presidential decisionmaking is part of the cultural legacy of the Cold War. It was certainly promoted in the early Cold War by presidents themselves as well as their congressional supporters.216 As a comparison of the relative ability of the executive and legislative branches to make speedy decisions, Hamilton’s argument is certainly plausible as far as it goes, but in the kind of government we have had since the Cold War began, it does not take us very far. Swift decisionmaking has little to do with a presidential decision to initiate the kind of war that has occupied us here. Wars involving the potential of thousands of American casualties, millions of foreign casualties, and the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars are usually not based on off-the-cuff decisions. Korea (especially taking into consideration the decision to cross the 38th parallel), Vietnam and the 1991 Gulf War were enormous undertakings and required layers of complex interagency decisionmaking, not a single swift move. Indeed, these considerations were part of what made it necessary in 1947 to establish the NSC to coordinate policy within the executive branch. During the Cold War and after, the pre-Pearl Harbor constitutional order was identified with isolationism and no one thought a return to that policy after 1945 was realistic. But while it is relevant to ask if there was an alternative, there is no escaping the ineluctable reality that the post-1945 order was a tragedy waiting to happen. That order was inconsistent with the historical meaning of the Constitution and the original constitutional order remained relevant to making decisions for war. Whether the post-1945 order was necessary or not, it introduced deep tensions into the American system of governance. The case studies presented above show that the interagency process taking place inside the executive branch was not an adequate substitute for the constitutionally mandated interbranch process. The inability of the executive branch to deliberate and make effective decisions on its own manifested itself in surprising ways. The executive branch has repeatedly failed to engage in effective war planning. With respect to Korea, Truman had to cope with the novelty of limited war and the fact that he would have been criticized by Republicans if he had ordered MacArthur to stop at the 38th parallel to restore the status quo ante. Nonetheless, it was his decision alone to unite the peninsula, a decision made essentially on the fly. In turn, that caused China to intervene. Korea then became a conflict of unanticipated scope that ended in stalemate and ruined Truman’s last years in office. True to his initial decision to intervene, Truman did not share responsibility with Congress and so Congress escaped both a valuable learning experience and the blame for the war. In addition, the case studies show that there is considerable evidence that the executive branch has had problems determining on war aims. President George H. W. Bush studiously avoided consulting Congress during the crucial period of decision in fall 1990 when it became possible to contemplate turning Operation Desert Shield into Desert Storm. This meant that he did not have to resolve on a unified set of war aims that would have been a necessary part of convincing Congress to authorize the war. Like Truman, Bush waited until it was too late to convince Congress and the public that the war had a point beyond forcing Iraq out of Kuwait. Thus the war had no substantial implications for policy and could not even help Bush remain in office. Not submitting the war to a timely congressional decision that Bush would have respected turned out not only to be counterproductive in terms of policy, but contrary to Bush’s political interests. Similarly, President George W. Bush failed to clarify what the war in Afghanistan was for beyond the removal of al Qaeda from Afghan territory. Partly as a consequence, the war became an endless struggle against the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan that is still ongoing as of 2012. It is striking that the executive, often represented by presidentialists as the branch that is most decisive and expert on matters of war, could consistently both fail to deliberate and fail to reach agreement on its goals in going to war. This suggests strongly that the pressures to shirk hard choices are too great to be overcome by one branch working alone.

Climate change is not anthropocentric and isn’t just the extinction of humanity—climate change is a product of white culture and means the extinction of minorities—their neutral representations of climate make warming inevitable

Wynter, ‘07 [2007, Sylvia, Professor Emeritus in Spanish and Romance Languages at Stanford Univeristy, “The Human being as noun? Or being human as praxis? Towards the Autopoietic turn/overturn: A Manifesto,” otl2.wikispaces.com/file/view/The+Autopoetic+Turn.pdf]

#### For if, as Time magazine reported in January 2007 (Epigraph 2), a U.N. Intergovernmental panel of Natural Scientists, were soon to release "a smoking-gun report which confirms that human activities are to blame for global warming" (and thereby for climate change), and had therefore predicted "catastrophic disruptions by 2100," by April, the issued Report not only confirmed the above, but also repeated the major contradiction which the Time account had re-echoed. This contradiction, however, has nothing to do in any way with the rigor, and precision of their natural scientific findings, but rather with the contradiction referred to by Derrida's question in Epigraph 3—i.e., But who, we? That is, their attribution of the non-natural factors driving global warming and climate change to, generic human activities, and/or to "anthropocentric forcings"; with what is, in effect, this mis-attribution then determining the nature of their policy recommendations to deal with the already ongoing reality of global warming and climate change, to be ones couched largely in economic terms. That is, in the terms of our present mode of knowledge production, and its "perceptual categorization system" as elaborated by the disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences (or "human sciences") and which are reciprocally enacting of our present sociogenic genre of being human, as that of the West's Man in its second Liberal or bio-humanist reinvented form, as homo oeconomicus; as optimally "virtuous Breadwinner, taxpayer, consumer, and as systemically over-represented as if it, and its behavioral activities were isomorphic with the being of being human, and thereby with activities that would be definable as the human-as-a-species ones. Consequently, the Report's authors because logically taking such an over-representation as an empirical fact, given that, as highly trained natural scientists whose domains of inquiry are the physical and (purely) biological levels of reality, although their own natural-scientific order of cognition with respect to their appropriate non-human domains of inquiry, is an imperatively self-correcting and therefore, necessarily, a cognitively open/open-ended one, nevertheless, because in order to be natural scientists, they are therefore necessarily, at the same time, middle class Western or westernized subjects, initiated 15 as such, by means of our present overall education system and its mode of knowledge production to be the optimal symbolically encoded embodiment of the West's Man, it its second reinvented bio-humanist homo oeconomicus, and therefore bourgeois self-conception, over-represented as if it were isomorphic with the being of being human, they also fall into the trap identified by Derrida in the case of his fellow French philosophers. The trap, that is, of conflating their own existentially experienced (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) referent "we," with the "we" of "the horizon of humanity." This then leading them to attribute the reality of behavioral activities that are genre-specific to the West's Man in its second reinvented concept/self-conception as homo oeconomicus, ones that are therefore as such, as a historically originated ensemble of behavioral activitiesas being ostensibly human activities-in-general. This, in spite of the fact that they do historicize the origin of the processes that were to lead to their recent natural scientific findings with respect to the reality of the non-naturally caused ongoing acceleration of global warming and climate change, identifying this process as having begun with the [West's] Industrial Revolution from about 1750 onwards. That is, therefore, as a process that can be seen to have been correlatedly concomitant in Great Britain, both with the growing expansion of the largely bourgeois enterprise of factory manufacturing, as well with the first stages of the political and intellectual struggles the British bourgeoisie who were to spearhead the Industrial Revolution, to displace the then ruling group hegemony of the landed aristocracy cum gentry, and to do so, by inter alia, the autopoetic reinvention of the earlier homo politicus/virtuous citizen civic humanist concept of Man, which had served to legitimate the latter's traditionally landed, political, social and economic dominance, in new terms. This beginning with Adam Smith and the Scottish School of the Enlightenment in the generation before the American, French, and Haitian (slave) revolutions, as a reinvention tat was to be effected in now specifically bourgeois terms as homo oeconomicus/and virtuous Breadwinner. 116 That is as the now purely secular genre of being human, which although not to be fully (i.e., politically, intellectually, and economically) institutionalized until the mid-nineteenth century, onwards, when its optimal incarnation came to be actualized in the British and Western bourgeoisie as the new ruling class, was, from then on, to generate its prototype specific ensemble of new behavioral activities, that were to impel both the Industrial Revolution, as well as the West's second wave of imperial expansion, this based on the colonized incorporation of a large majority of the world's peoples, all coercively homogenized to serve its own redemptive material telos, the telos initiating of global warming and climate change. Consequently, if the Report's authors note that about 1950, a steady process of increasing acceleration of the processes of global warming and climate change, had begun to take place, this was not only to be due to the Soviet Revolution's (from 1917 onwards) forced march towards industrialization (if in its still homo oeconomicus conception, since a march spearheaded by the 116 See the already cited essay by J.G.A. Pocock "symbolic capital," education credentials owning and technically skilled Eastern European bourgeoisie)—as a state-directed form of capitalism, nor indeed by that of Mao's then China, but was to be also due to the fact that in the wake of the range of successful anti-colonial struggles for political independence, which had accelerated in the wake of the Second World War, because the new entrepreneurial and academic elites had already been initiated by the Western educational system in Western terms as homo oeconomicus, they too would see political independence as calling for industrialized development on the "collective bovarysme "117 model of the Western bourgeoisie. Therefore, with the acceleration of global warming and climate change gaining even more momentum as all began to industrialize on the model of homo oeconomicus, with the result that by the time of the Panel's issued April 2007 Report the process was now being driven by a now planetarily homogenized/standardized transnational "system of material provisioning or mode of techno-industrial economic production based on the accumulation of capital; as the means of production of ever-increasing economic growth, defined as "development"; with this calling for a single model of normative behavioral activities, all driven by the now globally (post-colonially and post-the-1989-collapse-of-the-Soviet Union), homogenized desire of "all men (and women) to," realize themselves/ourselves, in the terms of homo oeconomicus. In the terms, therefore, of "its single (Western-bourgeois or ethno-class) understanding" of "man's humanity," over-represented as that of the human; with the well-being and common good of its referent "we"—that, not only of the transnational middle classes but even more optimally, of the corporate multinational business industries and their financial networks, both indispensable to the securing of the Western-bourgeois conception of the common good, within the overall terms of the behavior-regulatory redemptive material telos of ever-increasing economic growth, put forward as the Girardot-type "cure" for the projected Malthusian-Ricardo transumed postulate of a "significant ill" as that, now, ostensibly, of mankind's threatened subordination to [the trope] of Natural Scarcity, this in the reoccupied place of Christianity of its postulate of that "ill" as that of enslavement to Original Sin."' With the result that the very ensemble of behavioral activities indispensable, on the one hand, to the continued hegemony of the bourgeoisie as a Western and westernized transnational ruling class, is the same ensemble of behaviors that is directly causal of global worming and climate change, as they are, on the other, to the continued dynamic enactment and stable replication of the West's second reinvented concept of Man; this latter in response to the latter's existential imperative of guarding against the entropic disintegration of its genre of being human and fictive nation-state mode of kind. Thereby against the possible bringing to an end, therefore, of the societal order, and autopoetic living Western and westernized macro world system in it bourgeois configuration, which is reciprocally the former's (i.e., its genre of being human, and fictive modes of kind's condition of realization, at a now global level. This, therefore, is the cognitive dilemma, one arising directly from the West's hitherto unresolvable aporia of the secular, that has been precisely captured by Sven Lutticken in a recent essay. Despite, he writes, "the consensus that global warming cannot be ascribed to normal fluctuations in the earth's temperature... [the] social and political components of this process have been minimized; man-made nature is re-naturalized, the new (un)natural history presented as fate." And with this continuing to be so because (within the terms, I shall add, of our present "single understanding of man's humanity" and the unresolvable aporia which it continues to enact), "[t]he truly terrifying notion is not that [global warming and climate change] is irreversible, but that it actually might be reversible—at the cost of radically changing the economic and social order..."119 The changing, thereby, of the now globally hegemonic biologically absolute answer that we at present give to the question to who we are, and of whose biohumanist homo oeconomicus symbolic life/death (i.e., naturally selected/dysselected) code's intentionality of dynamic enactment and stable replication, our present "economic and social order" is itself the empirical actualization.

### War on Christmas

Embrace instability of argumentation – a turn to openness is the most meaningful decision – star this card.

Corder, ‘85 [Jim W. Corder is Professor of English at Texas Christian University. In 1975 he received the NCTE's Braddock Prize. He has published articles on rhetoric in various journals and has written several textbooks on writing.; “Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love”; Rhetoric Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Sep., 1985); Taylor & Francis]

d. We arguers can learn the lessons that rhetoric itself wants to teach us. By its nature, invention asks us to open ourselves to the richness of creation, to plumb its depths, search its expanses, and track its chronologies. But the moment we speak (or write), we are no longer open; we have chosen, whether deliberately or not, and so have closed ourselves off from some possibilities. Invention wants openness; structure and style demand closure. We are asked to be perpetually open and always closing. If we stay open, we cannot speak or act; if we are [sic] closed, we have succumbed to dogma and rigidity. Each utterance may deplete the inventive possibilities if a speaker falls into arro- gance, ignorance, or dogma. But each utterance, if the speaker having spoken opens again, may also nurture and replenish the speaker's inventive world and enable him or her to reach out around the other. Beyond any speaker's bound inventive world lies another: there lie the riches of creation, the great, un- bounded possible universe of invention. All time is there, past, present, and future. The natural and the supernatural are there. All creation is there, ground and source for invention. The knowledge we have is formed out of the plenti- tude of creation, which is all before us, but must be sought again and again through the cycling process of rhetoric, closing to speak, opening again to invent again. In an unlimited universe of meaning, we can never foreclose on interpretation and argument. Invention is a name for a great miracle-the attempt to unbind time, to loosen the capacities of time and space into our speaking. This copiousness is eternally there, a plentitude for all. Piaget remarked that the more an infant senses [sic], the more he or she wants to sense the world [sic]. Just this is what the cycling of rhetoric offers us: opening to invention, closing to speak, opening again to a richer invention. Utterances may thus be elevated, may grow to hold both arguer and other.

### 2AC FW MAIN

#### Our interpretations are beneficial for understanding debate education as fluid – utilizing metaphor as a starting point solves all their offense

O’Donnell, ‘4 [Timothy M. O’Donnell, Director of Debate, University of Mary Washington; “And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate”; Debater’s Research Guide, 2004; http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/ DRGArticles/Framework%20article%20for%20the%20DRG%20final2.doc]

In a world where proponents for any one of the varied questions are equally strident in staking out their views about what the debate ought to be about, agreement seems to be impossible. To be sure, there is value in each of these views. Public policy is important. The political consequences of policies are important. The language used in constructing policies is important. The presentational aspects of policy are important. The epistemological, ontological, and ethical underpinnings of policies are important. And so on. What are we to do then in situations where advocates on all sides make more or less equally compelling claims? As an educator, I am interested in having the students that I work with ask and answer all of these questions at one time or another. As a coach, I am interested in having them have a predictable set of arguments to prepare for. Thus, the question for me is, how can we have a game in which they have such an opportunity? The argument of this essay seeks to chart a partial answer to this question. It involves staking out a compromise position that recognizes that there is value in a wide variety of perspectives and that all deserve an equal opportunity to be represented in competitive debates. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a framework consists of “a set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions” that govern behavior. When we speak of frameworks in competitive academic debate we are talking about the set of standards, beliefs, or assumptions that generate the question that the judge ought to answer at the end of the debate. Given that there is no agreement among participants about which standards, beliefs, or assumptions ought to be universally accepted, it seems that we will never be able to arrive at an agreeable normative assumption about what the question ought to be. So the issue before us is how we preserve community while agreeing to disagree about the question in a way that recognizes that there is richness in answering many different questions that would not otherwise exist if we all adhered to a “rule” which stated that there is one and only one question to be answered. More importantly, how do we stop talking past each other so that we can have a genuine conversation about the substantive merits of any one question? The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis. Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point. How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.

### ---2AC T Version - Rana

#### Solely procedural solutions backfire and teach unrealistic advocacy.

Rana, ’11 [Aziz Rana received his A.B. summa cum laude from Harvard College and his J.D. from Yale Law School. He also earned a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard, where his dissertation was awarded the university's Charles Sumner Prize. He was an Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow in Law at Yale; “Who Decides on Security?”; 8/11/11; Cornell Law Library; <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/87/>]

Widespread concerns with the government’s security infrastructure are by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, such voices are part of a sixty-year history of reform aimed at limiting state (particularly presidential) discretion and preventing likely abuses. What is remarkable about these reform efforts is that, every generation, critics articulate the same basic anxieties and present virtually identical procedural solutions. These procedural solutions focus on enhancing the institutional strength of both Congress and the courts to rein in the unitary executive. They either promote new statutory schemes that codify legislative responsibilities or call for greater court activism. As early as the 1940s, Clinton Rossiter argued that only a clearly established legal framework in which Congress enjoyed the power to declare and terminate states of emergency would prevent executive tyranny and rights violations in times of crisis. After the Iran-Contra scandal, Harold Koh, now State Department Legal Adviser, once more raised this approach, calling for passage of a National Security Charter that explicitly enumerated the powers of both the executive and the legislature, promoting greater balance between the branches and explicit constraints on government action. More recently, Bruce Ackerman has defended the need for an “emergency constitution” premised on congressional oversight and procedurally specified practices. As for increased judicial vigilance, Arthur Schlesinger argued nearly forty years ago, in his seminal book The Imperial Presidency (1973), that the courts “had to reclaim their own dignity and meet their own responsibilities” by abandoning deference and by offering a meaningful check to the political branches. Today, Lawrence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge once more imagine that, by providing a powerful voice of dissent, the courts can play a critical role in balancing the branches. They write that adjudication can “generate[]—even if largely (or, at times, only) in eloquent and cogently reasoned dissent—an apt language for potent criticism.” The hope – returned to by constitutional scholars for decades – has been that by creating clear legal guidelines for security matters and by increasing the role of the legislative and judicial branches, government abuse can be stemmed. Yet despite this reformist belief, presidential and military prerogatives continue to expand even when the courts or Congress intervene. Indeed, the ultimate result has primarily been to entrench further the system of discretion and centralization. In the case of congressional legislation (from the 200 standby statutes on the books to the post September 11 and Iraq War Authorizations for the Use of Military Force to the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Acts), this has often entailed Congress self-consciously playing the role of junior partner – buttressing executive practices by providing its own constitutional imprimatur to them. Thus, rather than rolling back security practices, greater congressional involvement has tended to further strengthen and internalize emergency norms within the ordinary operation of politics. As just one example, the USA PATRIOT Act, while no doubt controversial, has been renewed by Congress a remarkable ten consecutive times without any meaningful curtailments. Such realities underscore the dominant drift of security arrangements, a drift unhindered by scholarly suggestions and reform initiatives. Indeed, if anything, today’s scholarship finds itself mired in an argumentative loop, re-presenting inadequate remedies and seemingly incapable of recognizing past failures. What explains both the persistent expansion of the federal government’s security framework as well as the inability of civil libertarian solutions to curb this expansion? In this article I argue that the current reform debate ignores the broader ideological context that shapes how the balance between liberty and security is struck. In particular, the very meaning of security has not remained static but rather has changed dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. This shift has principally concerned the basic question of who decides on issues of war and emergency. And as the following pages explore, at the center of this shift has been a transformation in legal and political judgments about the capacity of citizens to make informed and knowledgeable decisions in security domains. Yet, while underlying assumptions about popular knowledge – its strengths and limitations – have played a key role in shaping security practices in each era of American constitutional history, this role has not been explored in any sustained way in the scholarly literature.

### ---2AC Decisionmaking

Plan-focus teaches flawed decisionmaking – the government is a bad role-model.

Hafner, ‘7 [Ferdinand Hafner, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy; “COGNITIVE BIASES AND STRUCTURAL FAILURES IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: EXPLAINING DECISION-MAKING DISSONANCE IN PHASE IV POLICY AND PLANS FOR IRAQ”; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2007]

B. ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS In this model, foreign policy decisions are not based on the most optimal solution to achieve national interests. Instead, they are based on the most optimal outcome for the organization. Structural features of organizations are the variables that explain decision making and resultant organizational options to address policy issues. These features consist of rules, standard operating procedures, roles, and organizational relationships. Standard operating procedures, for example, explain whether decisions are made in a hierarchical or flat organizational system. Standard operating procedures also explain how routine processes such as information processing and communications influence decision making. Allison states that rules and “parochial priorities such as group pressures and the tenure of individuals,” also impact the decision-making process.21 The most important structural feature of organizations is authority and control, conceptualized as leadership functions, which influence organization roles and relationships. It is human action that affects changes to all other structural features influencing the decision-making process.22 Leaders hold the power to make and influence decisions through their control over the subordinates that produce policy options from within the unit.23 Organizations are social systems, with defined rules of behavior and relationships predicated on one’s position in the organization and its environment. The national security system is one example of a social system. Leaders, particularly in hierarchical and centralized decision-making systems, affect the behavior of organizations and decision outputs because of the strong role of positional authority over units and individuals. There is a pecking order of who reports to whom, who gives direction, and who takes direction.24 The career civil servants who are subordinate to their politically appointed leaders play an important role because of their indirect connection to the president through their unit leader and their ability to produce decision outputs that can directly impact presidential decisions.25 The organizational perspective also explains how various applications of leadership functions change the decision-making dynamic. The traditional approach views foreign policy decisions as organizational outputs requiring presidential action. The president may delegate decisional authority to subordinate leaders, however, empowering them to make foreign policy decisions that address national interests. Organization leaders, by virtue of their role or title, may also command considerable influence on the decision-making process so that foreign policy decisions have already been made by an organization’s leader instead of as a policy option influencing the president’s decision.28 Whether it is a unit output requiring presidential decisions or delegated authority and control to a unit, organizations and the decision makers that lead them, not the state, are the decisional units.29 C. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS According to this perspective, it is unrealistic to believe that the formulation of foreign policy and national security decisions occur without the influence of bureaucracies and individual agendas. Peter Gourevitch states that decisions are derived from ideas, and for an idea to win approval it must “acquire power.”30 The process by which an idea wins approval in the form of a decision and course of action entails a competition against other agendas. Ideas are influenced by both human and resource constraints, and it is these various forms of power that are captured under the concept of the bureaucratic politics paradigm. For example, Gourevitch states that bureaucratic competition requires “the support of various power rivals: money (budgets), arms, or institutions.”31 Institutions and individuals compete to perpetuate organization or group ideas that result in decisions favoring political goals. Graham Allison and Morton Halperin characterize decision making in bureaucracies as the “pulling and hauling” that occurs between various power brokers as the struggle to have agendas (ideas) acquire political power; it is the power required to win presidential approval for a course of action over other choices.32 Unlike the rational actor model, decisions and courses of action are not rational choices that are agreed on by decision makers and influenced by purposeful behavior between states. Allison and Halperin argue that foreign policy is and can be influenced by threats from the international system, but national security decisions are influenced by differences, not rational choices, between “domestic, organizational, and personal interests.”33 Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy outcomes are interdependent. In the bureaucratic politics perspective, positional power plays a significant role in how agendas get carried out as presidential decisions. For example, the Secretary of Defense, in general, wields more power than the Secretary of State. This is not to say that individuals with positional power can monopolize the decision-making process. No one individual can always win, and bureaucratic politics is a give-and-take process, where decisions are based on compromise, relinquishing certain aspects of one’s own personal position to achieve buy-in and approval from the larger group (bureaucracy) involved in the formulation of policy and decision making.34 Individuals do have their own ideas of foreign policy outcomes, but achieving a decision requires building consensus and negotiating comprises that result in a bargaining outcome. The process is neither an individual nor a unitary action. Gourevitch states that “majorities have to be built, coalitions constructed, and legitimating arguments developed.”35 Decision making in the bureaucratic politics paradigm, is a political or government action, not an individual action. D. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: COGNITIVE DISSONANCE Robert Jervis states that “it is impossible to explain crucial foreign policy decisions without reference to policy makers’ beliefs about the world and the motives of the actors in it.”36 An individual level of analysis approach to national decision making explains how state leaders use beliefs and images from their past and the present-day environment to make future decisions. The study of decision making through cognitive psychology explains how the use of cognitive shortcuts distorts a rational decisionmaking process. Alexander George states that individuals develop, over time, “beliefs, images, and social constructs about their physical and social environment.”37 Individuals display a natural tendency to frame decisions based on data that resonates with one’s environment. The potential consequence is marginalizing factual information, impeding the consideration of rational policy objectives. The reliance by individuals on personal belief systems and images of their environment is the tendency of the mind to make order out of new information, consistent with known beliefs.38 As a result, personal beliefs can affect the quality of foreign policy when they dominate the policy process by limiting the consideration of multiple courses of action.

### ---Conformity Turn

#### Their framework forces conformity, devaluing alternative rhetorical perspectives.

Secomb 2K (Linnell, a lecturer in Gender Studies at the University of Sydney “Fractured Community” Hypatia – Volume 15 Number 2 Spring 2000 pg. 138-139

This reformulated universalist model of community would be founded on "a moral conversation in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to reason from the others' point of view, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is paramount" (1992, 8). Benhabib argues that this model does not assume that consensus can be reached but that a "reasonable agreement" can be achieved. This formulation of community on the basis of a conversation in which perspectives can be reversed, also implies a new understanding of identity and alterity. Instead of the generalized other, Benhabib argues that ethics, politics, and community must engage with the concrete or particular other. A theory that only engages with the generalized other sees the other as a replica of the self. In order to overcome this reductive assimilation of alterity, Benhabib formulates a universalist community which recognizes the concrete other and which allows us to view others as unique individuals (1992, 10). Benhabib's critique of universalist liberal theory and her formulation of an alternative conversational model of community are useful and illuminating. However, I suggest that her vision still assumes the desirability of commonality and agreement, which, I argue, ultimately destroy difference. Her vision of a community of conversing alterities assumes sufficient similarity between alterities [End Page 138] so that each can adopt the point of view of the other and, through this means, reach a "reasonable agreement." She assumes the necessity of a common goal for the community that would be the outcome of the "reasonable agreement." Benhabib's community, then, while attempting to enable difference and diversity, continues to assume a commonality of purpose within community and implies a subjectivity that would ultimately collapse back into sameness. Moreover, Benhabib's formulation of community, while rejecting the fantasy of consensus, nevertheless privileges communication, conversation, and agreement. This privileging of communication assumes that all can participate in the rational conversation irrespective of difference. Yet this assumes rational interlocutors, and rationality has tended, both in theory and practice, to exclude many groups and individuals, including: women, who are deemed emotional and corporeal rather than rational; non-liberal cultures and individuals who are understood [sic] as intolerant and irrational; and minoritarian groups who do not adopt the authoritative discourses necessary for rational exchanges. In addition, this ideal of communication fails to acknowledge the indeterminacy and multiplicity of meaning in all speech and writing. It assumes a singular, coherent, and transparent content. Yet, as Gayatri Spivak writes: "the verbal text is constituted by concealment as much as revelation. . . . [T]he concealment is itself a revelation and visa versa" (Spivak 1976, xlvi). For Spivak, Jacques Derrida, and other deconstructionists, all communication involves contradiction, inconsistency, and heterogeneity. Derrida's concept of différance indicates the inevitable deferral and displacement of any final coherent meaning. The apparently rigorous and irreducible oppositions that structure language, Derrida contends, are a fiction. These mutually exclusive dichotomies turn out to be interrelated and interdependent: their meanings and associations, multiple and ambiguous (Derrida 1973, 1976). While Benhabib's objective is clearly to allow all groups within a community to participate in this rational conversation, her formulation fails to recognize either that language is as much structured by miscommunication as by communication, or that many groups are silenced or speak in different discourses that are unintelligible to the majority. Minority groups and discourses are frequently ignored or excluded from political discussion and decision-making because they do not adopt the dominant modes of authoritative and rational conversation that assume homogeneity and transparency.

### ---Reenchant Policymaking

Aff reenchants policymaking and is prerequisite to framework – the deconstructive joker opens space for alternatives to falsely universal solutions – we make play better

Parsons, ‘10 [Wayne Parson is Professor of Public Policy at Queen Mary, University of London. He is currently Visiting Professor in policy sciences at FLACSO, Mexico and the Catholic University of Lille; “Modernism redux: po-mo problems and hi-mo public policy” from “Public Management in the Postmodern Era: Challenges and Prospects”; 2010]

The shift towards the discourse of policy capacity involved therefore using the (best) bits of earlier (technocratic and managerialist) discourse (1960s hits), and re- packing them as ‘modernization’ and building policy/ governance capacities. Dror’s report to the Club of Rome, The Capacity to Govern, is redolent of a musty old technocratic ethos which was itself a remix of the kind of arguments he had put forward (in Public Policymaking Reexamined, 1968) before Neil Armstrong took that one small step: if government was going to solve problems, it had to get a lot smarter! Fast forward to the 1990s and the obsession with the challenge of ‘governance’ and ‘hollowed out states’ and the need for policy makers to improve their network steering capacities, and the solution for Dror was the same, except more so: plus ça change. The more complex problems became, the more government had to reassert its capacity to steer and navigate. In a similar vein, the World Bank, which had, from the beginning, a dominant role in the production of policy analysis, launched its remix: ‘we are the Knowledge Bank’ (‘things can only get better’) in 1996. No longer was the Bank just in the business of lending money and telling countries what to do: it mutated into a Bank that liked to share knowledge and build in- country analytical capacity. It was the Bank that was in the business of ‘technical guidance’. The plan was for the Bank to (apparently) vacate the driving seat but still provide the maps. It was still doing the navigating. And, at a time when academic students of public policy were warning about the dangers of thinking of policy making as a set of rational stages (Sabatier, 1999), HM government was using the rational model as the basis of creating a more ‘professional’ approach to policy making by remixing the policy stages model with a good dose of ye olde strategic management (Parsons, 2001). One could argue that the high- modernism remix of the Bank, in Dror and in HM government, was symptomatic of the remixing going on elsewhere from the mid- 1990s onwards. As politics was becoming more ‘non- ideological’ and ‘what matters is what works’ became the mantra of the modernizing faith, the policy process and policy analysis could be portrayed as essentially technical and managerial in orientation. In the absence of political or ideological grand narratives, the high- modernism of policy analysis became a kind of default setting: a ‘we don’t have an ideological agenda, we are just interested in what works, sharing knowledge and policy skills training’ grand narrative. In this case, we might read the high- modernism manifested in the 1990s as the product of the ‘end of ideology’ and a world without grand narratives. The big idea was that there was no big idea: ‘evidence’ should drive policy, and techniques and tools and models would improve the problem solving capacity of both the developed and developing world. Indeed, the 1990s remix was in many ways far more technocratic than discussed in Trevor Smith’s account of the 1960s and early 1970s. To govern was to design targets and specify outcomes and results and to manage, monitor and evaluate (even risk) so as to realize these targets. Thus it came to pass that a postmodern world was to give rise to high- modern modes of policy making and analysis. Highmodernism in public policy was just another postmodern remix of a sort: an exercise in self- referencing and technocratic bricolage. Perhaps the whole concept of ‘postmodern’, however, is not helpful when we come to think about alternatives to the kind of modernism we have experienced since the 1990s. It is possible to say that postmodernist describes the present human condition, but it does not take us far when we have to think in terms of what to do about health, housing, education, the economy, and so on. It may provide us with an account of the policy process, but it hardly seems relevant for thinking about how can we design policies. A postmodern policy – as a theory of a problem and, heaven forbid, a grand narrative – seems a contradiction in terms. Postmodernism can do a good job of deconstructing the world but appears to rule out constructing an alternative. The postmodern rejection of theory logically also rules out the idea of a ‘policy’ and ‘analysis’. If there is no privileged reading of a text and voice, and uncertainty is all in all, what then? It is a grand narrative that prohibits any other grand narrative. Do postmodern tools, therefore, have any place in the professional policy maker’s toolbox? On the face of it, no: but that may be the professional policy maker’s loss. What is lacking in the existing box of delights provided by the BWIs and others is a critical disposition: a way of looking at problems as constructed discourses, which serve to lock today’s problems in yesterday’s language. Deconstruction can challenge the assumptions and the mindset embedded in a policy language (Schram, 1993). As such it can be used, so it is argued, to help practitioners better understand the arguments they use and the alternatives to existing policy designs (Gillroy, 1997; Miller, 2002). Postmodern approaches have much to offer modern policy designers: above all they bring to the fore the importance of playfulness in the design process. Policy analysis as art and craft has been seen as the sole preserve of the species homo sapiens, but perhaps critical approaches also need to give homo ludens a try. Policy analysis in a wicked world has to deal (above all) with paradox, a world in which solutions do not exist, and in which meaning is not so obvious or so available or so desirable; a world in which we do not possess the luxury of a single perspective but have to deal with problems as existing within a multiplicity of ways of understanding [sic]. Playfulness requires an analysis of problems which recognizes the role of diff erent forms and kinds of knowledge. Like the fool, homo ludens should be licensed to poke fun and prick the bubbles of the powerful as they float around the corridors of power. The postmodern deconstructive tools in the box are the pig’s bladder and the motley: the tools of the fool. In this sense, policy analysis requires the same kind of playfulness that is a vital aspect of all human problem solving and design. Postmodern foolishness, above all, can serve to create space in which innovation (and a more critical modernity) can emerge. The postmodern fool plays the part that all the very best fools have played at the courts of the mighty: opening up space by challenging the supposed wisdom of the powerful, replacing clarity and dogma with ambiguity and doubt through verbal dexterity and ‘wit’. This opening up of policy space to ambiguity is especially important in the light of Wildavsky’s argument that, over time, the policy space becomes ever more dense and crowded: policies overlap and bump into one another and policies end up their own cause. Postmodernism can create space by questioning the fundamental (modernist) assumptions which support the architecture of policies and institutions: it does not presume to ‘speak truth to power’ but it interrogates and pricks that which is regarded as truth. The jester does this by being an outsider on the inside. The fool possesses the skill of being the outsider, the one whose cunning wit questions meaning and opens up the spaces between the words. As Hugh Miller shows, it can lampoon the contradictions and stupidities of supposedly neutral and objective forms of instrumental rationality that are embodied in bureaucracy and managerialism, and thereby expose solutions as little more than ‘bumper sticker’ slogans (Miller, 2002). So, ‘Vesti la giubba’ since postmodern motley is appropriate attire for the high- modern court: a court that is always at risk of believing in the power of rationality and its capacity for intellectual cogitation and is consequently invariably prey to taking itself seriously, self- deception, closedmindedness and groupthink. Postmodern analysis is the joker in the pack, the wild card that does not belong: the post modern analyst is neither a Jack, Queen or King, or a member of any suit in the pack. As such, postmodern policy analysis requires a very diff erent ‘skill set’ for professional policy makers than those which are generally deemed necessary. The postmodern fool may serve to create a more playful context for policy making: and in doing so it does not ‘postmodernise’ public policy per se, but may well contribute to its reenchantment. A reenchanted public policy would be less ‘post’ modern than a more critical, knowing and playful form of modernism.3 It was Max Weber who argued that the fate of our modern times was characterized by ‘rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world’ (Weber, 1991a: 155). This ‘entzauberung der Welt’ would, as a result of the spread of ‘rational, empirical knowledge’, transform the world into little more than a ‘causal mechanism’ (Weber, 1991b: 350–51). The modern world was, he gloomily forecast, doomed to be driven by the engine of disenchanted rationalization ‘until the last ton of fossilised coal was burnt’ (Weber, 1976: 181). Until then, ‘not summer’s bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a night of icy darkness and hardness’ (Weber, 1991c: 128). The new high priests of this dark, hard age would be the scientists, economists, bureaucrats, and all those whose claim to power was grounded in their claims to knowledge and technical expertise. A brief read through some of the recent outputs of the BWIs graphically illustrates that, if we ever doubted it, we still live in the realms of entzauberung, where the only knowledge or wisdom that counts is that possessed by those who do the counting and write the ‘guides’ and compile the toolboxes: a world in which rational analytical knowledge and bureaucratic hierarchy always triumph over local and more tacit forms of practical wisdom and where the loud and strident ‘grand narratives’ of the powerful all too often crowd out and shout down the stories told around the camp fires that warm the hard icy darkness. Well, the day when the last ton of fossil fuel is used up is not so far off : in which case, it is valid to ask what kinds of roads might lead to the warmer, sunlit and soft lands of neuverzauberung4 or ‘reenchantment’? The reenchantment of public policy begins when we recognize that the problems we face are of a wicked nature: they do not have ‘solutions’ which can be arrived at purely through the exercise of reason and analysis.

We face problems for which causal relationships are so complex that we cannot know when one problem ends and another begins, or whether the problems themselves have been caused by previous or existing policies. We confront a world in which ‘what works?’ is a simplistic and non sensical question. ‘What works?’, like probability, is a poor guide to action in a world in which ‘problems’ are not continuous over time and space. The fact that a policy had worked in one context does not mean that it will work in another. In the land of neuverzauberung causes and eff ects, and means and ends, are complex and confusing. We realize that we have to design solutions even though we can know so very little. It is a world in which students and practitioners have to become more modest about their capacities to (as Lindblom put it) ‘understand and shape society’. A reenchanted policy space is therefore a domain lacking the most powerful of modernist myths: there are, alas, no ‘zauberkugel’ – magic bullets – in the land of neuverzauberung. It is policy making that lays no claim to have magic bullets, silver or otherwise, which can be used in policy wars to hit targets.5 Just as there are no magic bullets for cancer or obesity or any other bodily ailment, in a reenchanted policy space we have to come to terms with the fact that there are no magic bullets for our ‘public’ ailments. One size does not fit all. The ‘policy’ as universal solution is recognized for what it is: the ubiquitous snake oil of modern political discourse. On reflection, the landscape of neuverzauberung in many ways off ers a very postmodern prospect: it is confusing and complex, and full of competing ideas of what counts as progress in theory and practice. Policy studies itself has always been a field with no defined boundaries or borders. It consequently has a topography which has been formed by the transgression of intellectual boundaries. Indeed, the mission of the policy sciences movement was (in Lasswell’s terms) to integrate knowledge. So, although the policy approach challenges disciplinary boundaries (like postmodernism) it does so in the belief that human knowledge could and should be integrated so as to solve human problems (so very non- postmodern). Hence, as Wildavsky (1987) observed, policy analysis has ‘expropriated lands’ from many disciplines, and for this reason any attempt to plot where the approach is (or is going) in a cartographic sense will ‘not take us very far’. In fact, in many respects, the policy approach is rather like Schumpeter’s defi nition of economics as being an ‘agglomeration of ill- coordinated and overlapping fi elds of research’, in which the frontiers of the field are ‘incessantly shifting’ (Schumpeter, 1954: 10). Policy analysis as an art and craft requires a variety of tools: most of which are ‘borrowed’. Given this, we should expect a reenchanted public policy to be far more diverse, if not downright eclectic and positively kleptic. If we understand public policy as an ‘agglomeration of ill- coordinated and overlapping fi elds’ which focuses on how human beings design problems and solutions to those conditions they consider to be public, then the toolbox must perforce contain a diverse range of approaches to be of any use to either students or practitioners. Progress in the past was very much about the search for a grand theory, the big idea. But the integration of knowledge relevant to analysis of the policy process, and for and in the process, cannot and should not be understood as an attempt at unification – or positivistic consilience (Wilson, 1998). In which case, progress in public policy may best be viewed as about increasing diversity and competition between different approaches, frameworks, tools and models.

# 1AR

#### Scientific solutions fail and postpone our realization that warming has already intruded every aspect of existence. Only the aff gives value to an existence slowly melting away.

#### Morton 2012

(Timothy Morton is a Professor of Literature and Environment at the University of California – Davis. January 11, 2012. “Peak Nature.” <http://www.adbusters.org/magazine/98/peak-nature.html>)

But these sorts of violent changes are exactly what global warming predicts. So every accident of the weather becomes a potential symptom of a substance, global warming. So all of a sudden this wet stuff falling on my head is a mere feature of some much more sinister phenomenon that I can’t see with my naked human eyes. I need terabytes of RAM and extreme processing speed to model it in real time (they were just able to do this in spring 2008). There is an even spookier problem with Aristotle’s arctic summer. If those arctic summers continue in any way, and if we can model them as symptoms of global warming, it is the case that there never was a genuine, meaningful (for us humans) sweltering summer, just a long period of sweltering that seemed real because it kept on repeating for say two or three millennia. Global warming, in other words, plays a very mean trick. It reveals that what we took to be a reliable world was actually just a habitual pattern – a collusion between forces such as sunshine and moisture and us humans expecting such things at certain regular intervals and giving them names, such as dog days. We took weather to be real. But in an age of global warming we see it as an accident, a simulation of something darker, more withdrawn – climate. As Harman argues, “world” is always presence-at-hand – a mere caricature of some real object. What Ben Franklin and others in the Romantic period discovered was not really weather, but rather a toy version of this real object, a toy that ironically started to unlock the door to the real thing. Strange weather patterns and carbon emissions caused scientists to start monitoring things that at first only appeared locally significant. That’s the old school definition of climate: there’s the climate in Peru, the climate on Long Island, but climate in general, climate as the totality of derivatives of weather events – in much the same way as inertia is a derivative of velocity – climate as such is a beast newly recognized via the collaboration of weather, scientists, satellites, government agencies, and so on. This beast includes the sun, since it’s infrared heat from the sun that is trapped by the greenhouse effect of gases such as CO2. So global warming is a colossal entity that includes entities that exist way beyond Earth’s atmosphere and yet it affects us intimately, right here and now. Global warming is a prime example of what I am calling a hyperobject, an object that is massively distributed in space-time and that radically transforms our ideas of what an object is. It covers the entire surface of Earth and most of the effects extend up to 500 years into the future. Remember what life was like in 1510? You are walking on top of lifeforms. Your car drove here on lifeforms. The iron in Earth’s crust is distributed bacterial excrement. The oxygen in our lungs is bacterial out-gassing. Oil is the result of some dark secret collusion between rocks and algae and plankton millions and millions of years in the past. When you look at oil you’re looking at the past. Hyperobjects are time-stretched to such a vast extent that they become almost impossible to hold in mind. And they are intricately bound up with lifeforms. The spooky thing is, we discover global warming precisely when it’s already here. It is like realizing that for some time you had been conducting your business in the expanding sphere of a slow motion nuclear bomb. You have a few seconds for amazement as the fantasy that you inhabited a neat, seamless little world melts away. All those apocalyptic narratives of doom about the “end of the world” are, from this point of view, part of the problem, not part of the solution. By postponing doom into some hypothetical future, these narratives inoculate us against the very real object that has intruded into ecological, social and psychic space. If there is no background – no neutral, peripheral stage set of weather, but a very visible, highly monitored, publicly debated climate – then there is no foreground. Foregrounds need backgrounds to exist. So the strange effect of dragging weather phenomena into the foreground as part of our awareness of global warming has been the gradual realization that there is no foreground! The idea that we are embedded in a phenomenological lifeworld, for instance, tucked up like little hobbits in the safety of our burrow, has been exposed as a fiction. The specialness we granted ourselves as unravelers of cosmic meaning (Heideggerian *Dasein* for instance) falls apart since there is no meaningfulness possible in a world without a foreground-background distinction. Worlds need horizons and horizons need backgrounds, which need foregrounds. When we can see everywhere, when I can Google Earth the fish in my mom’s pond in her garden in London, the world – as a significant, bounded, horizoning entity – disappears. We have no world because the objects that functioned as unrecognizable [sic] scenery for us, as backdrops, have dissolved.